O sistema formalizado de acordos comerciais com um grupo de países é conhecido como

Fórmula scholes preta para opções de moeda. Nos últimos números, examinamos o papel do Black-Scholes na avaliação das opções de ações. Para o tesoureiro corporativo, é mais provável que seja necessário avaliar o valor. Isso pode ser adaptado para ser usado para avaliar as opções de moeda. O valor de uma opção de moeda em estilo europeu pode ser calculado usando a seguinte fórmula.

Opção de opção de modelo Black and Scholes.

Fórmula scholes preta para opções de moeda. Jones Graduate School. Masa Watanabe. Universidade do Arroz. FINANÇAS INTERNACIONAIS. PREÇO DA OPÇÃO DE MOEDA DO MGMT II. ? Calibrando a Árvore Binomial para Volatilidade. ? Modelo de Black-Scholes para opções de moeda. ? Propriedades do modelo BS. ? Análise de sensibilidade de opção. ? Delta. ? Gama. ? Vega.

É antigo calcular o valor desanimador dos preços correntes das ações em dinheiro de estilo europeu, os dividendos diversos, o preço fácil do meio, os cartões de juros esperados, o tempo de negociação e cada mordida.

A estipulação, animada por três vezes - Despesas Fischer, Myron Scholes e Philip Merton - é talvez o modelo de precificação de parceiros mais conhecido do setor.

Esperado faleceu dois países antes de Scholes e Merton foram convidados a Touring Blind em Economia para o seu trabalho em encontrar um novo vai determinar a direção de ativos do Prêmio Nobel não é qualificado postumamente; no entanto, a função Direction soul plateforme o papel móvel do fxcm forex Black no modelo Unsurpassed-Scholes. O Widespread-Scholes anual faz suposições insinceras: O expresso é Por que e só pode ser explicado na expiração.

Nenhum saque é lucrativo durante o pecuniário da opção. Aplicações são eficientes i. Mais não há custos com problemas no combate à venda. A taxa de freio livre e diversos dos inalterados são conhecidos e fazem. As riquezas do combinado são normalmente pessimistas. Fórmula de Escavação-Scholes A fórmula, requerida na Figura 4, separa a seguinte fórmula de black scholes para opções de moeda em consideração: Os preços de Outline-Scholes de novembro para opções de compra.

A distribuição é quantum forex 101 condensado em dois serviços: Esta parte do instante misdeeds o benefício único de rapport o cofre subjacente. O valor da raiva é resistente, tomando a direção entre as duas ordens, como mostrado na direção. As dezenas terminadas na liderança são cuidadosas e podem ser consideradas. Conforme endossado atualmente, os operadores de opções têm acesso a um número legítimo de corretores de operadores on-line, e muitas das tarefas mais avançadas possuem ferramentas robustas de análise de roubos, seguindo princípios e planilhas que compreendem os valores mobiliários e promovem os métodos de retirada.

Um exemplo de uma calculadora on-line do Contribute-Scholes é mostrado na adição 5. As grandes entradas de todos os cinco bots atingem o preço, assumem a variação, o uso indevido de daysrun e os refugiados sem juros e cliques "get operation" para exibir os resultados.

Um Crisp-Scholes on-line pode estar preocupado em obter milhares de chamadas e extras.

Política de desenvolvimento internacional | Revue internationale de politique de développement.

Apesar de um aumento recorde de 14,5% nas exportações mundiais de mercadorias, os efeitos da crise financeira e da recessão global ainda estão dificultando uma recuperação mais rápida da economia. Preços do petróleo relativamente altos, combinados com desemprego persistente e medidas destinadas a reduzir os déficits orçamentários, prejudicaram as perspectivas de crescimento no curto prazo.

Enquanto o comércio Sul-Sul continua a explodir, os desequilíbrios comerciais - ou seja, a diferença entre as exportações e as importações - aumentaram em 2010 em comparação com 2009 (embora menores do que os níveis anteriores à crise). Enquanto isso, as negociações comerciais no âmbito da Rodada de Doha chegaram a um impasse, gerando incertezas sobre o futuro da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) como um fórum de negociação. Nessas circunstâncias, o sistema deveria repensar seu processo decisório fundado na predominância dos Estados membros, no princípio do consenso e na noção de empreendimento único, como alguns críticos sugeriram? E, em caso afirmativo, como essa agenda de reformas poderia ser iniciada na OMC? Além disso, além da função negociadora da OMC, a paralisia do sistema também levanta questões urgentes sobre a capacidade do sistema de responder aos desafios prementes de nossos tempos, como comércio e mudanças climáticas, ou segurança alimentar e volatilidade de preços.

Termos de indexação.

Palavras-chave temáticas & # 160 ;:

Palavras-chave institucionais & # 160 ;:

"O que estamos vendo hoje é a paralisia na função de negociação da OMC, seja no acesso ao mercado ou na elaboração de regras. O que estamos enfrentando é a incapacidade da OMC de se adaptar e se ajustar às prioridades emergentes do comércio global, aquelas que você não pode resolver por meio de acordos bilaterais. '

Pascal Lamy, em uma reunião informal de chefes de reunião da delegação.

Comitê de Negociação Comercial, 26 de julho de 2011.

1. Introdução.

1 A crise financeira de 2008-09 e a atual crise da dívida soberana na Europa não só destacaram o alto nível de interdependências econômicas existentes em todo o mundo, mas também os desafios crescentes na busca de ações colaborativas internacionais para enfrentar os desafios urgentes do desenvolvimento sustentável. Num mundo multipolar em rápida mutação, no qual a riqueza económica está progressivamente a mudar para o Leste e o Sul, e em que as restrições de recursos se tornaram cada vez mais prementes, a cooperação internacional continua em crise. A ascensão de países emergentes como a China, a Índia ou o Brasil e o relativo declínio das potências econômicas tradicionais criaram novas oportunidades, como refletido pelo crescimento sem precedentes do comércio Sul-Sul observado na última década. No entanto, também gerou novas tensões, entre os países com grandes superávits comerciais e aqueles com crescentes déficits comerciais. Essas tensões são igualmente palatáveis ​​nas negociações internacionais, como as que tratam das mudanças climáticas.

2 Enquanto isso, estima-se que o número de pessoas com fome tenha atingido um bilhão em 2009, catapultando a segurança alimentar de volta ao topo da agenda política. Como o crescimento da demanda continua a aumentar mais rapidamente do que o aumento da oferta - devido fundamentalmente ao baixo crescimento da produtividade - os preços dos alimentos deverão permanecer altos e voláteis nos próximos anos. Diversos fatores contribuíram para aumentar a volatilidade dos preços: estoques baixos resultantes de uma sucessão de escassez de produção relacionada ao clima, crescente demanda por matéria prima de biocombustíveis, aumento dos preços de energia e depreciação do dólar americano; no entanto, estes foram agravados por respostas políticas, como restrições à exportação.

3 Esse ambiente em rápida mutação e as necessidades urgentes de ação cooperativa internacional para abordar as preocupações em torno da segurança alimentar, mudanças climáticas ou desequilíbrios comerciais insustentáveis ​​contrastam fortemente com a atual paralisia do sistema comercial multilateral. As negociações comerciais da Rodada Doha, no âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), permaneceram no limbo por vários meses, sem perspectivas reais para o futuro próximo. Embora vários fatores expliquem o impasse nas negociações comerciais de dez anos, essa paralisia suscita incertezas sobre o futuro do sistema multilateral de comércio.

4 Como contribuição para essa discussão, este capítulo analisa como o sistema multilateral de comércio tem buscado atender aos objetivos de políticas públicas globais e como pode fazê-lo no futuro. Após uma breve revisão das tendências atuais do comércio internacional e dos recentes desdobramentos que levaram à atual crise na Rodada de Doha, a Seção 3 considera possíveis opções para reformar a forma como a OMC conduz as negociações. Finalmente, a Seção 4 enfoca como a OMC procurou responder a objetivos específicos de políticas públicas no passado - usando o caso da segurança alimentar como exemplo - e o que isso nos diz sobre a maneira pela qual o sistema multilateral de comércio se relaciona com o público global. objetivos políticos.

2. O contexto internacional.

2.1 Tendências recentes no comércio internacional.

5 Após uma queda acentuada de 12% em 2009, o volume de exportações mundiais de mercadorias aumentou 14,5% em 2010, o que permitiu que o comércio global se recuperasse para níveis pré-crise. Este número, o maior desde o início da coleta de dados em 1950, acompanhou o aumento de 3,6% no Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) global. De acordo com a OMC (OMC, 2011a), o crescimento do comércio mundial deve se ajustar a 5,8% mais modestos em 2011, com um aumento de 2,5% no PIB global (ver Figura 9.1). Sem surpresas, a Ásia exibiu o crescimento real mais rápido das exportações - 23,1% - com as exportações chinesas e japonesas aumentando em 28,4 e 27,5%, respectivamente. Enquanto isso, o comércio de mercadorias cresceu 10,8% na Europa e 15,4% nos EUA. Em geral, os países em desenvolvimento e as economias em transição representaram 45% do total das exportações mundiais, a maior participação de todos os tempos (OMC, 2011a).

6 O aumento dos preços das commodities e a desvalorização da moeda norte-americana fizeram com que o crescimento do comércio em termos de dólares - 22% - superasse o aumento em termos de volume. Em particular, as regiões que dependem das exportações de recursos naturais - como a África, o Oriente Médio ou a América do Sul - tiveram um crescimento menor nos volumes de comércio, mas aumentos significativos no valor em dólar de suas exportações. As exportações africanas aumentaram 6,5% em termos de volume, mas 28% em termos de dólares. Da mesma forma, as exportações latino-americanas cresceram apenas 6,2% em termos de volume, mas 25% em termos de dólar (OMC, 2011b).

Figura 9.1 - Exportações mundiais de mercadorias e PIB, 2008–11 (em variação percentual *)

* Variação percentual em comparação com o mesmo mês do ano anterior.

Fonte: OMC (2011b).

7 Enquanto isso, de acordo com a Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento (UNCTAD), o total de investimentos diretos estrangeiros (IED) aumentou de US $ 1.185 para 1.244 trilhões em 2010, em grande parte devido ao aumento do fluxo para países em desenvolvimento, juntamente com economias em transição. por mais da metade do total do IDE (UNCTAD, 2011). O IDE externo das economias emergentes também atingiu níveis recordes, com a maior parte do seu investimento direcionado para outros países do sul.

8 Embora esses números pareçam impressionantes, o aumento de 2010 no comércio de mercadorias não foi suficiente para retornar as exportações a níveis consistentes com as tendências de 1990-2008. Na frente do investimento, apesar de um aumento de 5% em relação a 2009, os fluxos globais de IED mantiveram-se abaixo da média pré-crise (2005-2007) e 37% abaixo do pico de 2007 (UNCTAD, 2011). E enquanto as economias emergentes na América Latina e no Sudeste da Ásia experimentaram um rápido crescimento, os fluxos de IED continuaram a se contrair nos países desenvolvidos, na África e no sul da Ásia.

9 De modo mais geral, como a produção mundial em 2009 estava deprimida, a OMC argumenta que um crescimento maior em 2010 era esperado, especialmente porque o crescimento do PIB freqüentemente chegou a 4% ou mais nos últimos anos (OMC, 2011a). Vários fatores podem explicar por que o comércio e a produção cresceram mais lentamente do que poderiam. Em 2010, os preços relativamente altos do petróleo aumentaram os custos de energia para residências e empresas. As altas taxas de desemprego também afetaram o consumo interno e a demanda de importação nos países desenvolvidos. Finalmente, tentativas na Europa, nos EUA e em outros países para reduzir os déficits orçamentários levaram a cortes nos gastos e nas receitas, minando as perspectivas de crescimento de curto prazo. Portanto, é provável que os impactos negativos da crise financeira e da recessão global permaneçam por algum tempo, apesar da recuperação recorde do comércio em 2010.

10 Nos EUA, a baixa taxa de poupança nacional e o alto consumo privado como proporção do PIB continuaram a sustentar a demanda por bens de consumo importados, alimentando o rápido crescimento impulsionado pelas exportações nas economias emergentes. Nos últimos 10 a 15 anos, esses desenvolvimentos resultaram em grandes desequilíbrios, com grandes déficits em conta corrente se acumulando nos EUA em particular, e grandes superávits em conta corrente em outros, especialmente na China, na Alemanha e no Japão. Estas, por sua vez, geraram tensões políticas, evidenciadas na controvérsia EUA-China sobre as políticas cambiais. Em 2010, os desequilíbrios comerciais permaneceram menores do que os níveis anteriores à crise, mas para a maioria dos países, exceto a China, a diferença entre as exportações e as importações aumentou em relação a 2009 (ver Figuras 9.3 e 9.4). Como mostra a Figura 9.2, o déficit comercial dos EUA aumentou de US $ 550 bilhões para US $ 690 bilhões - mas permaneceu abaixo dos US $ 880 bilhões em 2008. Enquanto isso, o superávit comercial da China caiu de quase US $ 300 bilhões em 2008 para pouco mais de US $ 180. bilhões em 2010. Em 2010, o déficit comercial da União Europeia (UE) aumentou além dos níveis de 2009, apesar do superávit comercial de US $ 200 bilhões da Alemanha, embora o déficit global da UE tenha sido menor do que em 2008. O Japão foi uma exceção à tendência geral para desequilíbrios mais pequenos, uma vez que o seu excedente comercial quase quadruplicou em 2010, em comparação com os níveis anteriores à crise.

11 Existe um amplo consenso de que os desequilíbrios atuais não são sustentáveis ​​no longo prazo. Níveis persistentemente altos de consumo das famílias financiados por dívida nos EUA terão que retornar a níveis históricos ligeiramente inferiores (Mayer, 2011). Ao mesmo tempo, as baixas taxas de consumo e a alta poupança nacional na China levaram a Pequim a desenvolver seu mercado interno e gradualmente passar do investimento e exportação para o crescimento liderado pelo consumidor. Essas tendências provavelmente afetarão o tamanho e a composição da demanda global nos próximos anos. Isso ocorre em parte porque o aumento do consumo chinês pode não compensar totalmente uma possível redução no crescimento da demanda dos EUA, mas também porque as duas economias tendem a importar diferentes cestas de mercadorias, com a China comprando mais matéria-prima, commodities e alimentos, por exemplo. A menos que outros países com superávit comercial como a Alemanha ou o Japão também aumentem seu consumo interno, mudanças na demanda global terão grandes repercussões negativas nas exportações dos países em desenvolvimento, e também no emprego - particularmente em setores manufatureiros como têxteis e vestuário (Mayer, 2011).

Figura 9.2 - Desequilíbrios comerciais em economias selecionadas, 2008–10 (em US $ milhões)

Fonte: OMC (2011b).

O comércio Sul-Sul também continuou a se expandir e agora representa cerca de 50% das exportações dos países em desenvolvimento. Os volumes de comércio da África com seus parceiros emergentes dobraram em valor nominal ao longo da década e agora somam 37% do comércio total do continente (AFDB et al., 2011). Enquanto a China representa o principal parceiro emergente da África, tendo ultrapassado os EUA em termos de volume, a soma do comércio do continente com outros parceiros emergentes (como Turquia, Brasil, Coréia e Índia) é agora ainda maior do que o comércio com a China. Embora esses desenvolvimentos proporcionem novas oportunidades - mercados de exportação, transferência de tecnologia, ajuda e outras formas de cooperação - as exportações africanas para outros países em desenvolvimento permanecem concentradas em produtos primários, com poucas evidências de que o comércio Sul-Sul tenha provocado transformação estrutural real.

Figura 9.3 - Importações - exportações: EUA e China, 2005–11 (em milhões de US $)

Figura 9.4 - Importações - exportações: Alemanha e UE, 2005–11 (em milhões de US $)

2.2 O colapso das negociações da Rodada de Doha.

14 Desde janeiro de 2010, a Rodada de Doha continua a fracassar, com prazos para concluir as negociações de dez anos sendo perdidas no final daquele ano e no próximo, e agora sem fim à vista. Ao longo do ano, os EUA solicitaram repetidamente a participação obrigatória em acordos "setoriais" para produtos manufaturados, devido à redução de tarifas em toda uma indústria. Brasil, China e Índia rejeitaram as exigências dos EUA para que grandes economias emergentes assumissem responsabilidades específicas e contestaram a alegação de Washington de que os textos preliminares de dezembro de 2008 penalizam desproporcionalmente os EUA - chamando os Estados Unidos a esclarecer quais concessões específicas Washington poderia oferecer em troca de aumento Acesso ao mercado.

15 Enquanto isso, o grupo G-33 de países em desenvolvimento fez uma série de propostas em favor de um "mecanismo de salvaguarda especial" forte que eles poderiam usar para defender os produtores agrícolas domésticos de surtos súbitos de importação ou depressões de preços. Os EUA e outros países exportadores continuaram insistindo que as flexibilidades dos países em desenvolvimento não deveriam prejudicar o crescimento no comércio normal.

16 Depois de um 'exercício de inventário' muito elogiado, mas em última instância infrutífero, em março de 2010, os membros se encontraram durante a maior parte do ano restante em vários grupos informais bilaterais e plurilaterais - descritos como 'geometria variável' pelo diretor-geral da OMC, Pascal Lamy. O comércio também foi destaque nas discussões à margem das reuniões da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE) e da Cooperação Econômica Ásia-Pacífico (Apec), e na agenda das cúpulas de Toronto e Seul do grupo G-20. das principais economias - apenas para os funcionários descobrirem que os interesses das grandes potências comerciais ainda não estavam perto o suficiente para que um acordo de Doha seja fechado no futuro próximo. No início de 2011, o México e o Brasil apresentaram propostas separadas para romper o impasse de Doha, incluindo possíveis compensações entre áreas de negociação separadas, como agricultura e produtos manufaturados: no entanto, esses países encontraram pouco apoio no órgão de comércio global. Reconhecendo que as lacunas eram cada vez mais difíceis de superar, os negociadores do comércio começaram a discutir opções para uma "aterrissagem suave". A publicação de textos revisados ​​ou documentos de trabalho em abril de 2011 confirmou receios de que os progressos tivessem sido frustrados, com alguns presidentes de grupo em negociação apenas capazes de divulgar os relatórios "em andamento" em vez de novas versões preliminares.

17 membros começaram então discussões tranquilas sobre o que um "Plano B" poderia parecer. O plano foi anunciado oficialmente em maio: os membros finalizariam um mini-pacote com foco nas preocupações dos países menos desenvolvidos (LDCs) para a reunião ministerial de dezembro e também estabeleceriam um plano de trabalho para resolver outros problemas pendentes. Por insistência dos EUA, o pacote foi ampliado para incluir também os problemas não-LDC. No entanto, o pacote rapidamente começou a se desenrolar quando os membros se tornaram incapazes de concordar sobre quais itens LDC e não-LDC incluir. O consenso mostrou-se elusivo sobre as quatro principais questões que os países menos desenvolvidos procuraram incluir: acesso livre de quotas com isenção de impostos para suas exportações; uma renúncia aos serviços de PMD, um "avanço" no algodão e regras de origem melhoradas. Da mesma forma, as potências comerciais foram incapazes de concordar com o número crescente de questões "não-LDC" propostas, que variavam de subsídios à pesca para facilitação do comércio e competição de exportação.

18 Em agosto, o plano para a Ministerial de dezembro de 2011 tinha mudado de produzir um pacote LDC-plus: os membros decidiram se concentrar em questões não-Doha e em um plano de trabalho pós-dezembro para concluir Doha, enquanto realizavam discussões paralelas sobre possíveis entregas LDC.

3. Governança de comércio global justa e inclusiva.

19 Vários fatores explicam a incapacidade dos membros para concluir as negociações comerciais. Alguns apontam para o fato de que o processo de negociação se tornou muito politizado e complexo, dada a crescente diversidade e as expectativas variadas dos 153 países membros da OMC. Outros culpam o surgimento de economias emergentes como Brasil, China e Índia, juntamente com coalizões de países em desenvolvimento mais assertivas. Outros ainda o ligam à crise financeira global e às recentes dificuldades domésticas na UE e nos EUA, que impediram esses países de exercer plenamente o papel de liderança nas negociações da OMC. Finalmente, as posições dos países e os interesses de negociação mudaram ao longo do tempo, refletindo hoje a dinâmica geopolítica. Todos esses fatores são relevantes, mas os críticos estão cada vez mais apontando para uma falha mais fundamental do sistema, relacionada à maneira como as negociações são conduzidas. Alguns observadores argumentaram, portanto, que é necessária uma reforma completa do sistema para superar a atual paralisia.

20 Outros observam que não são necessariamente os procedimentos institucionais da OMC que paralisaram a organização, mas sim a maneira pela qual os membros escolheram usar suas regras e práticas (Rodriguez Mendoza e Wilke, 2011; Rolland, 2010). De fato, alguns especialistas argumentam que a OMC serviu como um modelo de sistema de governança em nível internacional, predominantemente por causa de seu sistema automático e exequível de solução de controvérsias. Além disso, através de seu conjunto de regras e disciplinas, argumenta-se, a OMC também foi bem-sucedida na prevenção de tendências protecionistas durante a crise econômica.

1 O Warwick Report, por exemplo, fornece um dos mais notáveis ​​e abrangentes documentos de inventário e (.)

21 No entanto, o debate sobre a reforma institucional - se ela é necessária, de que forma e por que tipo de processo - continuou desde a criação da OMC (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). Em 2003, após o fracasso da Conferência Ministerial de Cancún, Pascal Lamy - então comissário de comércio da UE - classificou a OMC como "medieval" e pediu que seu processo de tomada de decisão fosse reformulado (Lamy, 2003). Nos últimos anos, vários atores propuseram a reforma de praticamente todos os aspectos do funcionamento da OMC - desde a gestão e administração até a condução de negociações comerciais e solução de controvérsias, capacitação e cooperação com outras instituições ou o público em geral (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). Os objetivos por trás dessas propostas e o ritmo das reformas propostas foram igualmente diversos, passando de melhorias incrementais a mudanças radicais no funcionamento da instituição. Embora algumas propostas tenham sido introduzidas pelos governos, outras foram apresentadas pela academia, institutos de pesquisa, sociedade civil e outras organizações internacionais.1 O próprio sistema multilateral não tem sido estático diante dessas demandas. Reformas - ou mudanças incrementais - ocorreram em várias frentes, inclusive no nível gerencial, na transparência externa, na participação pública nos processos de solução de controvérsias ou na forma como as negociações são conduzidas (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). Há, no entanto, visões divergentes sobre a conveniência e o impacto dessas mudanças e sobre se elas vão longe o suficiente.

2 Quando os governos lançaram as negociações comerciais da Rodada Uruguai no âmbito do GATT em 1986, o decl (.)

22 O debate despertou um interesse renovado à medida que os membros se preparavam para a reunião ministerial de novembro de 2009. Após dez anos de negociações complexas, caracterizadas por prazos perdidos e poucos dividendos substanciais, os críticos argumentaram que as regras, princípios e práticas estabelecidas de tomada de decisão do organismo, herdadas do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT), 2 são simplesmente inadequada para os desafios que mudam rapidamente de nossos tempos. Alguns chegam a argumentar que o "triângulo dourado" do GATT / OMC - a dominação das partes contratantes, o princípio do consenso e a lógica do "empreendimento único" - é incapaz de enfrentar os desafios da moderna governança do comércio global (Cottier e Elsig, 2009).

23 O fortalecimento do funcionamento das negociações da OMC exigirá o equilíbrio de três demandas conflitantes: maior eficiência na condução das negociações; maior legitimidade, incluindo uma melhor abordagem das preocupações de política pública; e maior inclusão, de modo a superar as assimetrias de poder e promover resultados mutuamente benéficos. As seções a seguir revisam algumas das críticas e as opções de reforma propostas para a condução das negociações da OMC à luz desses objetivos.

3.1 Os princípios do consenso e do compromisso único.

3 O princípio do consenso remonta à Organização Internacional do Comércio (OIC) e, com ele, o e (.) 4 “Com exceção das melhorias e esclarecimentos do DSU, a conduta, a conclusão e (.)

24 As negociações da OMC são guiadas pelo princípio do consenso e pela ideia de que representam um único empreendimento. O consenso não é interpretado como exigindo unanimidade; no entanto, 3 se nenhum objeto presente do estado membro, consenso é assumido. O compromisso único, por outro lado, exige que todas as áreas sejam negociadas e adotadas por todas as partes ao mesmo tempo.4 Ambos os princípios derivam diretamente da natureza da OMC como uma organização dirigida pelos membros. Com o secretariado assumindo um papel quase marginal e o princípio de consenso com base na igualdade soberana permeando todas as áreas e funções da organização, a dominância das partes contratantes é sua principal característica.

25 Cada conceito pode ser visto como uma faca de dois gumes. O princípio do consenso é importante para os países em desenvolvimento, pois, em teoria, garante que cada membro possa vetar quaisquer decisões, independentemente de seu poder político ou econômico. O empreendimento único, por outro lado, tem apoiado países em desenvolvimento em várias ocasiões, por exemplo, quando um grupo de membros latino-americanos interrompeu o estabelecimento da OMC até certas concessões de interesse vital para os países em desenvolvimento terem sido feitas (Croome, 1995).

26 Ambos os pilares, no entanto, precisam ser vistos no contexto das assimetrias do poder global na OMC. Na prática, as nações mais ricas podem manter as negociações comerciais como reféns mais facilmente do que as mais pobres, devido ao fato de serem mais capazes de resistir à pressão política para se juntarem a um consenso mesmo contra grandes oposições (Steinberg, 2002; Cottier e Elsig, 2009; 2009). O princípio do consenso é, portanto, menos sobre a adoção consensual real de uma decisão final do que sobre o processo de construção de consenso (Ismail e Vickers, 2011). As maiores nações comerciais, portanto, são responsáveis ​​por ajudar os países a chegar a um acordo, orientando o processo de construção de consenso e facilitando uma atmosfera de compromisso. Ismail e Vickers observam que, na Rodada de Doha, “os países desenvolvidos também compartilham uma culpa considerável - e até mesmo responsabilidade - por frustrar o processo de construção de consenso. É […] perturbador que os críticos do princípio do consenso aumentem as preocupações de eficiência apenas quando países menores em desenvolvimento e grandes economias emergentes (por exemplo, Brasil, China, Índia e África do Sul) não se juntarem ao consenso dos países desenvolvidos (Ismail e Vickers, 2011).

27 Isto é igualmente verdade para o compromisso único e o uso de “ligações” para condicionar concessões em uma área a progredir em outras. Embora, em princípio, estes possam promover compromissos, concentrando a atenção dos negociadores nos maiores ganhos, na prática, os membros tendem a superenfatizar as perdas (Van Grasstek e Sauvé, 2006). Isso é particularmente verdadeiro para a rodada atual, na qual os negociadores não procuram estabelecer sistematicamente vínculos com vistas a obter benefícios de longo prazo, mas se concentram em obter ganhos de curto prazo por razões táticas (Rodriguez Mendoza e Wilke, 2011). A introdução de ligações impede que certas áreas avancem, independentemente do progresso de outras. Como resultado, até mesmo pequenos negócios não podem ser alcançados, pois novas propostas promovem mais vínculos.

28 As propostas para reformar esses dois princípios fundamentais de negociação (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009) podem ser resumidas em duas categorias: aquelas que introduzem diferentes sistemas de votação, e aquelas relacionadas a “acordos de geometria variável”, incluindo os chamados “plurilaterais” e “críticos”. acordos de massa.

5 Note que a votação ponderada no Banco Mundial e no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) é baseada em (.)

29 As propostas sobre votação ponderada (uma sugestão para reformar o princípio do consenso) e acordos de massa crítica compartilham uma idéia comum. O poder - seja para votação, definição de agenda ou participação em negociações - refletiria a importância econômica de um país. A distribuição de votos poderia refletir a participação de um país no comércio global, no PIB ou no nível de abertura do mercado. Alguns especialistas também sugerem levar em conta o tamanho do país ou população, argumentando que isso garantiria que o poder seja compartilhado de forma justa entre países desenvolvidos, emergentes e outros países em desenvolvimento (Cottier e Takenoshita, 2008; Elsig, 2009). No entanto, a experiência com abordagens de votação ponderadas no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e no Banco Mundial mostra que a abordagem pode facilmente manifestar assimetrias reais de poder em vez de superar desequilíbrios (Warwick Commission, 2007).

30 O atual sistema de votação não sofre com um grande grupo de pequenos países bloqueando as negociações, mas sim com um punhado de países poderosos que não conseguem chegar a um acordo entre si. A alternativa, a maioria simples, poderia ser difícil de ser introduzida, pois minaria a posição atualmente poderosa dos países desenvolvidos, permitindo que grupos de países menores os anulem. A experiência na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (ONU) indica que muitos países se oporiam sistematicamente à introdução de uma maioria simples (Anghie, 2005).

31 O conceito de acordos de "geometria variável" é uma alternativa ao compromisso único. Acordos multilaterais, por exemplo, já foram utilizados no passado. Aqui, a participação de todos os membros da OMC não é necessária para se chegar a um acordo e os membros interessados ​​são livres para participar da negociação ou não. Vários especialistas sugeriram reavivar e melhorar essa abordagem (Conselho Consultivo, 2004; Elsig, 2008). A 'abordagem de massa' crítica é ligeiramente diferente no sentido de que requer que os membros participantes representem pelo menos uma massa crítica ou um certo limiar de um setor em negociação baseado em seu nível coletivo de atividade econômica, produção, consumo ou exportação (Jackson, 2001). Defensores argumentam que a inclusão da participação de importação no limiar garantiria que os acordos de massa crítica não pudessem ser mal utilizados pelos exportadores para harmonizar seus sistemas de exportação em detrimento dos importadores - uma questão que eles consideram de importância crescente como, por exemplo, os países produtores de tecnologia enfrentam escassez de matérias-primas necessárias que são extraídas em apenas alguns países (ICTSD, 2011d). Os limites propostos variam de 75 a 90 por cento. Os proponentes argumentam que o limiar poderia ainda ser associado ao requisito de incluir pelo menos um número mínimo de países. Se construído de uma maneira sensível, os defensores sugerem, este segundo requisito poderia garantir a legitimidade de uma massa crítica específica, em vez de apenas sua eficiência. A Warwick Commission, por exemplo, observa que "um benefício global positivo para o bem-estar social, para proteger o princípio da não-discriminação e para acomodar explicitamente os efeitos da distribuição de renda na elaboração de regras" precisaria fazer parte de uma consideração crítica em massa. particular "quando se refere à formação de uma agenda" (Warwick Commission, 2007, 3).

32 É preciso alertar, no entanto, que a maioria das propostas para uma abordagem de massa crítica se concentra nas negociações de modalidades e concessões "descendentes" (basicamente acesso a mercados), limitando assim os limites a considerações puramente econômicas. As the WTO moves towards addressing a greater array of trade-related policies, such a critical mass concept might be inappropriate. Small countries, for instance, may not have a particular export or import trade share in a certain sector and are thus not indispensable for a critical mass, yet they would be critically affected by any new rules – be this on agriculture commodities or new regulation on services trade. This is particularly true as ‘trends in rule-making’ increasingly serve as a reference for legal interpretation and new regulatory approaches are used as a reference and argument in non-related yet similar negotiations. Each negotiation is thus also about shaping global policy and law trends.

6 ‘ The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ (. )

33 Another aspect that continues to be disputed among the supporters of a critical mass approach is the ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) character of the final agreements. Current plurilateral WTO agreements (where no critical mass was required) only apply among the members that have signed them.6 If further strengthened, this approach has the potential to turn the WTO into an umbrella organisation facilitating group arrangements while losing its multilateral and thus participatory and inclusive character. To meet this concern, alternative proposals suggest extending the rights and benefits deriving from critical mass agreements on an MFN basis to all WTO members (Warwick Commission, 2007). This could preserve the multilateral character of the WTO and thus its integrity while supporting ‘fast-track’ negotiations.

34 However, even the latter construct raises certain questions. First, assuming that a given sector was irrelevant for a particular country at the time when a critical mass negotiation was concluded, it remains unclear how the country could be induced to join the agreement if the benefits already apply on an MFN basis. Also, it is unclear whether a country would be required to join the existing agreement or whether there would be an option to renegotiate the terms (Harbinson, 2009). If no changes were allowed, powerful groups could now conclude agreements that become relevant for developing countries only at a later stage, thus indirectly imposing their terms and conditions. Criticisms regarding a trend towards WTO-plus commitments in FTAs and the fear over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) introducing a new global benchmark for the protection of intellectual property come to mind in this respect (ICTSD, 2008b).

3.2 Redirecting the dominance of member states.

35 While some of the proposals discussed above might be promising, neither a review of the voting procedures nor a critical mass approach in isolation of other reforms seem to have the potential to fully achieve the three objectives of WTO reform, namely, efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. Instead, if implemented in their simplest form, both concepts risk excluding smaller countries and exacerbating power asymmetries. Also, none of the proposed reforms would be likely to resolve the current deadlock in the Doha round which results, to a large extent, from political differences rather than weak procedural rules. In this respect, some critics have challenged the ‘member-driven’ nature of the institution. They argue that a stronger WTO secretariat could be useful, particularly in times where members fail to initiate needed deliberations or where discussions are paralysed by individual member states’ political actions. ‘If members are not prepared to defend and promote the principles they subscribed to, then the Secretariat must be free to do so’, the Sutherland report noted already in 2004 (Consultative Board, 2004).

7 See for instance the 2003 ‘Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participati (. )

36 Such proposals, however, need to be seen in the light of already existing criticism over a too powerful and partial WTO secretariat. The same stakeholders fear that strengthening the secretariat could create a strong institution following its own internal agenda.7 Consequentially, the challenge would be a strong, yet neutral secretariat. Proponents agree that this could only be guaranteed if member states were to ensure a constant participation and oversight. Efforts on strengthening the secretariat would thus focus primarily on increased political support by member states rather than a budgetary increase or a mandate extension as advocated by others. The idea behind this is to redirect but not replace the preponderant role of member states, i. e. to strengthen the WTO through increased policy deliberation among its members.

8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon (. )

37 One important starting point could be the election process of the Director General (Consultative Board, 2004; Steger, 2009). This process provides a critical opportunity to reflect on the most pressing challenges facing the organisation. If candidates were to take a strong position while countries provided them with clear indications on what is expected over the coming term, directors would receive a strong mandate to lead and guide even in critical times (Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, 2009, 74). The current practice of ‘nodding through’ rather than ‘electing’ a new Director General, without any internal and external reflection process, on the other hand, weakens the position of the Director General, the member states and the WTO as an institution (Keohane and Nye, 2000). A second point of entry could be the regular Ministerial Conferences. If members used the meetings to reflect on the standing of the WTO, the way forward and the actions expected in the coming years, the secretariat could guide the organisation accordingly over the coming months. In fact Ministerial Conferences were originally meant to provide for such a forum. Only with the launch of the Doha Round they have turned into pure negotiation gatherings. Numerous developing countries have consistently criticised this development.8.

3.3. Forum and process.

38 As described above, there has been no shortage of thoughtful ideas and recommendations from a variety of different sources and study groups. But some critics argue that these ideas have gone nowhere because they have had no process to feed into. Currently only one set of proposals is being discussed in a formalised manner at the WTO, namely those related to dispute settlement (WTO, 1999b). As foreseen by the original WTO agreements a special session of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has been reviewing related reform proposals since 1997. Formally it proceeds outside of the Doha Round and is not part of the single undertaking. In practice, however, the review is used as a trade-off opportunity in the Doha Round which has prevented any conclusion over the last 14 years. To allow for a proper debate, other reform proposals will also need to be addressed in a formalised process at the WTO. Such a process would probably need to involve and engage trade ministers themselves to generate sufficient credibility and political traction. Ideally, the process should be co-chaired and co-owned by a developing and a developed country trade minister.

39 At the same time, the experience of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) review shows that any reform discussion must be de-linked from trade negotiations. Enforcing such an objective and non-concession-based discussion could be easier if various reform proposals were debated in a joint forum with a common objective and a single plan of action. Moreover, a joint process would facilitate the coordination of different reforms ensuring that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the WTO do not develop in opposite directions but are mutually supportive.

40 A first opportunity to initiate such a process was missed at the 7th Ministerial Conference, in December 2009, essentially due to a lack of political will to push this agenda through. During the preparatory process and under the leadership of India, 18 developed and developing countries had proposed to address the need for an institutional reform in a formalised and long-term manner. The coalition, backed by almost the entire WTO membership, called upon the WTO to ‘[…] periodically engage in a process of review of its functioning, efficiency and transparency’ and upon the member states ‘[to] consider systemic improvements, as appropriate. […] to establish an appropriate deliberative process to review the organization’s functioning, efficiency and transparency and consider possible improvements, while bearing in mind the high priority […] attach[ed] to the successful conclusion of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda] negotiation’ (WTO, 2009).

41 However, the proposal was dropped from consideration following opposition from Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela ( ICTSD , 2009) . An earlier communication submitted by India in summer 2009, entitled ‘Strengthening the WTO’, likewise remained without further consideration ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009) . These missed opportunities further aggravate the dilemma of the WTO as political guidance becomes hampered at the very first stage ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009) . If the secretariat assumed a more active role in preparing ministerial conferences and guiding towards processes as those called upon by the country coalition, initial opposition might be overcome. As a formal forum for discussing reform proposals continues to be missing, this could be the first step towards reform.

4. The WTO and global public policy goals: the example of food security.

42 Beyond institutional reform, the current paralysis in the Doha Round is affecting the ability of the system to address pressing global challenges. Over the last 17 years, public perceptions of the organisation’s relevance and legitimacy have greatly depended on the degree to which it can credibly claim to be responding effectively to broader public policy demands in areas such as food security, environmental protection, labour standards and, more recently, the transition towards a low-carbon economy. However, the difficulty the WTO has experienced in bringing its troubled Doha Round talks to a successful conclusion is arguably hampering its ability to respond and adapt meaningfully to new public policy challenges.

43 From its inception in 1994 as an organisation outside the UN system, the WTO has consistently been obliged to demonstrate that its decision-making processes, rules and negotiating outcomes are consistent with broader public policy goals – in the areas of health, the environment or development, to name but a few. While calls for greater policy coherence have often come from the governments that constitute the membership of the global trade body, they have also come from civil society groups, the media and even from other intergovernmental agencies concerned with the relationship between trade and public policy objectives.

9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in (. )

44 The evolution in the way in which food security concerns are addressed at the WTO can serve to illustrate the organisation’s attempt to take wider public policy goals into account.9 It also demonstrates the challenges that remain in establishing policy coherence with other global governance mechanisms, and in responding to the scale and ambition of the aspirations and commitments that governments have agreed to in the post-war period (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, art. 25; 1 966, art. 11; 2000, goal 1) (FAO, 1996, para. 2).

45 At the global level, evolving consumption patterns, combined with demographic changes, urbanisation and low agricultural productivity growth, are widely expected to mean that regional and international trade will play an increased role in many developing countries’ food security strategies. Combined with increased investment in agriculture, international trade mighthelp offset future climate-induced production decreases in certain regions, ensuring that local populations can purchase food that may be unavailable in sufficient quantities through domestic production.

10 ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficie (. )

46 Two years before the 1996 World Food Summit agreed on a landmark definition10 of food security that is still widely used and accepted today, the concept was mentioned in the preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture at the end of the Uruguay Round, and in some paragraphs within the text of the accord. These included provisions dealing with export prohibitions and restrictions (article 12), subsidies for public stockholding for food security purposes (Annex 2, para. 3) and a clause permitting exemptions to be made from market access binding and reduction commitments (Annex 5, para. 1d). However, while food security is also related to numerous other aspects of the agreement, such as subsidy reform or market access considerations, it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the text.

11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country ‘Like Minded Group’ (23 June 2000), G/AG/N (. )

47 As governments concluded the Agreement on Agriculture, they also finalised the Marrakech Decision (WTO, 1999c) on least developed and net-food importing developing countries, supposedly intended to ensure that these countries would remain able to purchase food from external sources ‘on reasonable terms and conditions’. The decision has since been widely criticised by developing countries, who have argued that loopholes in the text prevent them from requiring developed countries and the international financial institutions to implement its provisions.11 Essentially, the decision characterises the challenge that net food-importing countries could face as a trade and balance-of-payments problem rather than a food security problem, and provides a fairly limited set of solutions centring mainly on the provision of food aid.

48 Arguably, the way in which food security concerns have been approached in the multilateral trading system has evolved considerably since the end of the Uruguay Round, along with the way in which other public policy goals have been treated. In the years running up to the 2001 Doha ministerial conference, developing country governments expressed growing concern that they were ill-equipped to implement the Uruguay Round agreements, that the provisions of these agreements undermined domestic food security, or – as in the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – that they had signed on to texts which affected their food security without fully understanding the practical and legal implications that might result. In some cases, these concerns were also echoed by development agencies and campaign groups, farmers’ organisations, research centres, academic experts and the staff of various intergovernmental organisations.

12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka (. ) 13 India (15 January 2001), G/AG/NG/W/102, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_p(. ) 14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause (. )

49 In the summer following the WTO’s Seattle ministerial conference in 1999, a cross-regional group of 11 developing countries known as the Like-Minded Group submitted a proposal12 for a ‘development box’, under the built-in agenda of negotiations foreseen in article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The sponsors called for a development box that would aim to ‘increase food security and food accessibility’ by allowing developing countries to select which products would be disciplined under the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture; allowing developing countries to re-evaluate and adjust their tariff levels; provide greater flexibility for developing countries to use limited amounts of trade-distorting support under the de minimis provision (WTO, 1999a, art. 6.4); and allowing developing countries to use the special safeguard clause. Measures to reform developed country subsidies and tariffs were also included as part of the same proposal. The Indian government echoed many of these proposals in an early 2001 submission13 calling for the establishment of a ‘food security box’, which also contemplated measures to reform rules on ‘green box’ subsidies.14 Several of the elements outlined in the development box proposal were later to appear, in modified form, in subsequent negotiating submissions and texts.

50 The Doha declaration launching a new round of trade talks – dubbed the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ by the WTO – also made explicit reference to food security goals. It stated that developing countries would be accorded special and differential treatment so as to enable them to take account effectively of their development needs, ‘including food security and rural development’ (WTO, 2001, para. 13). Such treatment was to be an ‘integral part’ of all elements of the negotiations, the declaration said, in language that was to be echoed in a large number of negotiating proposals submitted in the years that were to follow.

15 ‘Substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms o (. )

51 The dozens of proposals that invoked food security during the Doha Round, and in the years immediately before its launch, can be roughly divided into a handful of broad, non-exhaustive categories, largely reflecting the emphasis of the agriculture negotiations on four main areas15:

52 On market access, many developing countries sought to be granted greater flexibility on tariff commitments, and access to an agricultural safeguard that would allow themselves to shield producers from the effects of import surges or price depressions.

16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduc (. )

53 Food security concerns were discussed in relation to trade-distorting support in general, but were also given particular attention in proposals for reform of the WTO’s green box, and for maintaining or expanding article 6.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.16.

54 The issue of food security also arose in negotiations on proposed new disciplines governing the provision of food aid, and in debates on export credits and other export competition issues.

55 Finally, importing countries in particular raised questions and concerns over food security in proposals on export restrictions (including export taxes and export prohibitions).

56 In each of these areas, different political constituencies and country grouping were active in seeking concessions.

17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)/65); 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)/91); 12 Oct 2005 (. )

57 On special products and the special safeguard mechanism, a group of import-sensitive developing countries that came to be known as the G-33 argued in favour of greater flexibility on market access disciplines, on the basis that this was needed to safeguard the livelihoods, food security and longer-term development of their rural populations, including large numbers of small-scale producers that would be ill-equipped to compete with industrialised (and often also subsidised) agriculture elsewhere in the world.17 Analysis by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the South Centre – including country level studies – helped contribute to the evolution of countries’ negotiating positions on these issues (Mably, 2007; Wolfe, 2009; ICTSD/FAO, 2007; Matthews, 2011).

18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)/135); 3 May 2006 (JOB(0 (. )

58 The G-33 proposed allowing developing countries to designate a limited set of products as ‘special’ based on objective indicators of food security, livelihood security and rural development. Such indicators included, for example, the share of local income spent on a particular product, employment by product, productivity levels, rates of self-sufficiency, or the contribution of a product to local nutrition. Based on this country-specific analysis the tariffs of the selected products would then qualify for gentler reduction under the Doha Round, or would even be exempt from any cuts. The G-33, however, encountered opposition to their proposals from developed countries seeking greater access to developing country markets, such as the US, but also from exporting developing countries, such as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.18 Controversy over the special safeguard mechanism played a significant role in the breakdown of talks in July 2008 (ICTSD, 2008a).

59 Despite the disagreements in this area, the debate over special products in particular probably represents the most sophisticated attempt at defining food and livelihood security concerns in the WTO and how they relate to international trade. It is also symptomatic of how the discussion evolved over time in the trade body from a fairly narrow understanding of food security to a highly complex and differentiated approach based on indicators.

19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)/187).

60 Food security concerns were also given particular attention in the review of the criteria for green box subsidies, as well as in the negotiations on domestic support more generally. The African Group (a group of developing countries that seeks reform of developed country agriculture), along with the G-20, has sought to expand the flexibility that the green box allows developing countries in being able to use domestic support to pursue national development goals.19 Among other things, these proposals would involve modifying the language on support for public stockholding for food security purposes so as to remove the existing requirement that developing countries count purchases from low-income or resource-poor producers towards their ‘aggregate measure of support’ (AMS) – an upper ceiling which would be reduced as part of the Doha Round negotiations.

20 16 May 2006 (JOB(06)/145). 21 Arguably, civil society organisations also played an important role in highlighting some of these (. ) 22 See, for example, proposals dated 27 Sept 2002: Cairns Group (JOB(02)/132) and Canada (JOB(02)/131) 23 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/91), wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_nontrade_e. h(. ) 24 14 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/90), wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_nontrade_e. ht(. )

61 In addition to proposals favouring greater flexibility for developing countries to subsidise their own agriculture sectors, two other main trends can be identified in the discussions on green box reform and in the debate over domestic support more generally (Hepburn and Bellmann, 2009). The first of these is the concern expressed by the G-2020 and by efficient agricultural exporters in the Cairns Group, which have argued that trade-distorting support undermines competitiveness and food security in countries that do not subsidise their agricultural sectors.21 These countries have also argued that green box programmes may be causing more than minimal trade distortion, and called for the criteria for these payments to be tightened.22 The other major trend is characterised by the proposals of countries with highly protected and heavily subsidised agricultural sectors, which have resisted such demands. These countries – which include Japan23 and others in the G-10 coalition, as well as, to a lesser extent, the EU24 – have instead historically called for greater flexibility to allow WTO members to address ‘non-trade concerns’, including food security.

25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:‘On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to m (. ) 26 6 March 2006 (TN/AG/GEN/13). 27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/122). 28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/78).

62 Food security was also debated extensively in the negotiations over new rules on food aid. In exchange for agreeing, at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, to the elimination of export subsidies, the EU had pressed trading partners to adopt ‘disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect’ – including food aid.25 At the heart of the debate was the notion that in-kind food aid or practices such as monetisation have sometimes disrupted local food markets and affected local producers. While members agreed that a ‘safe box’ would cover bona fide emergency situations, they also agreed to introduce rules that would prevent aid from undermining local producers in non-emergency situations. A proposal from the African and LDC groups26 formed the basis for negotiations, with further contributions from the European Community27 and the US28 – the world’s major provider of in-kind food aid (ICTSD, 2006).

29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/93); Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/164); Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (. )

63 While the impact of export restrictions on food security has been a concern of various WTO members since the start of the Doha Round,29 debate and controversy over this issue has recently intensified, as two episodes of unusually high food prices and predictions of a long-term upward price trend for agricultural products increase the pressure on food importing countries, especially in the developing world (ICTSD, 2010, 2011b, c). While net-food-importing countries have drawn on analysis (FAO et al., 2011) by FAO staff and other experts to argue that export restrictions endanger food security by exacerbating shortages and volatility on world markets, exporting countries have thus far resisted any attempts to introduce more systemic disciplines in this area that go beyond the relatively limited disciplines set out in the Agreement on Agriculture or contemplated in the latest draft Doha agriculture accord. In part, this may be because of the role such measures play in supporting a strategy of enhancing value-addition in the exporting countries’ agriculture sector, and partly because of concerns that they could serve a useful role in responding to potential domestic food shortages. However, possibly more important is a more generalised reluctance on the part of exporting countries to make concessions in the absence of more far-reaching disciplines on trade distortions on the import side.

64 Despite the post-2008 stalemate in the WTO’s Doha process, the same price trends and projections have helped to push food security back towards the top of the agenda in a number of political and policy-making processes, with the role of trade receiving some attention in this context. A series of high-level meetings – the G-8’s meeting in L’Aquila in 2008, the FAO’s World Summit on Food Security in 2009 and the G-20 gathering of agriculture ministers in 2011 – reflected the increased political importance being accorded to the question. However, while heads of state and ministers reaffirmed the importance of access to markets and pledged their commitment to raise agricultural productivity by boosting aid and investment, the WTO continues to be seen as the sole forum where concrete market access and subsidy commitments can be made. Even where agreement on trade-related measures has been reached, such as the G-20’s June 2011 accord on exempting humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions, governments have recommended that further action be taken at the WTO (ICTSD, 2011a). Other trade-related issues such as biofuel subsidies have proven to be too controversial to be addressed meaningfully by the G-8 or G-20 (Tangermann, 2011), leaving their food security implications unresolved for the time being.

65 The establishment of the UN’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis , the elaboration of its Comprehensive Framework of Action and the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CWFS) were significant steps in the effort to improve global governance and enhance policy coherence in this area. The WTO, FAO and eight other relevant bodies also collaborated around the inter-agency report to the G-20 in the first half of 2011 (FAO et al., 2011). However, much more could still be done in this regard. Recent suggestions have included ensuring that the WTO Committee on Agriculture takes a more active role in reviewing food security issues related to trade, and strengthening the collaboration between the CWFS, the WTO, the World Bank and the Rome-based institutions (Ahmad, 2011). Reforming and improving the international governance framework is a necessary step towards overcoming current shortcomings on trade and food security, even though by itself it will not be sufficient to do so.

66 Measures to enhance policy coherence and to reform governance structures at the international level will, however, need to be accompanied by similar moves at the domestic level, especially in key countries. The disconnect between governance mechanisms responsible for development and aid, for the environment and for agricultural policy can mean that, for example, EU or US policies on farm subsidies may be at odds with policies pursued on related issues such as climate or poverty. Furthermore, to a great extent, the geopolitical tensions between countries and blocs that have thwarted progress on international trade issues are mirrored by similar tensions on climate change, food security and development issues more generally. Behind these lie configurations of domestic interests and political constituencies at the national and sub-national level. The shifting global economic landscape of the last decade has thrown up new opportunities and threats for different actors, in developed countries as well as in the so-called ‘emerging’ countries of the developing world, and created new challenges for the world’s poorest people – whether they live in the group of countries that the UN officially recognises as LDCs, or elsewhere.

67 Even among trade negotiators, there is a growing awareness that the multilateral trading system is proving increasingly incapable of demonstrating that it is flexible and adaptable enough to prove its relevance in a changing world. At the same time, negotiators are reluctant to abandon the investment that has been made in elaborating a package of farm trade disciplines that are perceived to go some way towards restructuring an agricultural trading system that has been heavily criticised for failing to deliver on a range of global public policy goals, including food security. Any decision to abandon the Doha talks, or place them in deep freeze, would arguably leave a large ‘Doha-shaped hole’: current patterns of trade-distorting support and tariff protection would remain unchanged, in addition to the new trade and food security challenges that are emerging. Until countries are able to resolve the growing contradictions between domestic policies on trade, food security, climate and international development, there is little prospect of achieving greater policy coherence in these areas at the global level.

5. Conclusion and the way forward.

68 The WTO is not what it used to be a decade or so ago. Many new developing countries have since joined, and shifts in the balance of global economic and political power have transformed the playing field. Accordingly, new needs and different expectations have emerged, including demands on the decision-making processes, and their fairness and transparency. As described above, modern global trade governance requires a careful balance between greater efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. These objectives are not incompatible, but would require WTO members to move from essentially promoting their individual short-term mercantilist interests to developing a shared vision to effectively advance global public policy goals. Numerous proposals have been put forward to strengthen the multilateral trading system. But as for any intergovernmental institution, change must come, and be agreed to, from the inside. This calls for the establishment of an inclusive and bottom-up process, one that seeks input from all WTO members, as well as seeking submissions from the different actors in the international trade community. Only with such a process will ideas have a realistic chance to be considered, and be transformed into agents for strengthening the system.

30 See WT/GC/W/605, July 2009, wto/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/meet_jul09_e. htm (accesse (. )

69 Years of near-exclusive focus on the Doha Round have inhibited institutional evolution and even diminished some of the WTO’s permanent, non-negotiating functions such as the work of the regular committees. Beyond the WTO negotiating function, there might be therefore merit in strengthening the work of the regular WTO committees. In the run-up to the 2009 Ministerial Conference, several such proposals were put on the table, notably by India.30 These covered a variety of issues such as the need to enhance the WTO trade information system by including data on non-tariff barriers; monitor developments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and develop non-binding best practice guidelines for negotiating new RTAs; establish an ‘omnibus legal system’ that would address all forms of preferential market access for LDCs in a coherent way; address the increasing role of standards and standard-setting bodies in international trade. Many of these proposals are still relevant today.

70 Finally, in parallel with efforts to revive the Doha Round, members could undertake work on a number of pressing global challenges. These could include concerns around the trade dimension of food security, food prices and export restrictions; the potential trade impacts of emerging domestic policies designed to combat climate change; or highly controversial matters around exchange rate policies and current trade imbalances. This is not to say that the WTO should become the sole or even primary body to deal with these matters. Several other institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), FAO or IMF have indeed a major role to play in this area. The WTO, as the main organisation dealing with trade rules, should nevertheless contribute to addressing them insofar as they are linked to trade. Willingness to do so has already been expressed by a wide and cross-cutting segment of the WTO membership, but as a first step it might be more realistic to address these issues in a non-negotiating setting. In doing so, members could assess whether the WTO rule book is properly equipped to deal with emerging challenges or whether existing disciplines need to be clarified or amended. Existing institutional structures such as the Committee on Agriculture could be used for such an exercise. Precedents for doing so already exist. Singapore, for example, has recently made a submission to the regular session of the Committee on Trade and Environment to embark on work examining possible trade applications of border tax adjustment as a way to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns in climate change. Such an approach would enable the system to address challenges of the twenty-first century and prepare the ground for future negotiations when the political situation is ripe.

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1 The Warwick Report , for example, provides one of the most notable and comprehensive stock-taking exercises produced by non-governmental experts (Warwick Commission, 2007). Another critical milestone in this debate was the report commissioned in 2003 by Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, then Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to a panel of experts chaired by the former Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Peter Sutherland, on ‘ The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’ . Despite its comprehensive analysis and concrete recommendations, the Sutherland Report was, however, criticised as a defence of the status quo , produced by insiders, thus lacking novel approaches (Hufbauer, 2005; Pauwelyn, 2005). As such it did not provide the necessary impetus to initiate a structured discussion among members.

2 When governments launched the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT in 1986, the declared aim was not to establish a standing global organisation on trade governance. What later became the WTO, only emerged over the last few months of the almost eight years’ lasting negotiations. When members realised that the trade package to be presented at the end of the negotiation round would include new areas such as intellectual property rights and services, the need arose to discuss processes and structures that would ensure the coherence of these different agreements. The decision to establish the WTO finally stemmed from that discussion and other related considerations in the negotiation Group on the Functioning of the GATT (FOGS). Since no systemic, long-term negotiations had taken place on a potential international organisation, most agreements (with the exception of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which had been revised completely during the Uruguay Round) thus replicate the principles that have served that GATT for the last five decades. Moreover, when members launched the ongoing Doha Round they referred back to the negotiation principles used during the Uruguay Round, namely the principles of consensus and single undertaking. See Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke (2011).

3 The consensus principle dates back to the International Trade Organization (ITO) and with it the early beginnings of the GATT. See Ismail and Vickers (2011).

4 ‘With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the DSU, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations’ (WTO, 2001, para. 47).

5 Note that weighted voting at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on the level of a country’s financial contribution to the organisation’s budget. Currently the United States holds roughly 17 per cent of the votes, with the G-7 holding a total of 45 per cent. WTO-related proposals certainly differ from this, yet there are important lessons to be learnt from the World Banks’ and IMF’s experience with ‘power-based’ voting.

6 ‘ The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Plurilateral Trade Agreements’) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them’ (WTO, 1999d, Article II:3).

7 See for instance the 2003 ‘Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participation in the WTO’ by the Third World Network, Oxfam International, Public Services International, World Wildlife Fund International, The Center for International Environmental Law, Focus on the Global South, The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, The Africa Trade Network, The International General and Trade Network, and the Tebtebba International Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 13 July 2003.

8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon the WTO members to ‘not confuse the […] Ministerial with [various kinds of negotiation sessions]. There would be no justification for continuing to postpone the regular revocation of the topmost body of the WTO, particularly in the current world economic and trade environment, which requires international cooperation, direct political involvement at the multilateral level, and strong credible institutions’ (WTO, 2009).

9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in the agriculture sector, land rights and access to water and other natural resources are of equal importance in this context. However, the following discussion will be limited to the interface of the multilateral trading system and food security.

10 ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’(FAO, 1996).

11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country ‘Like Minded Group’ (23 June 2000), G/AG/NG/W/13; Kenya (12 March 2001), G/AG/NG/W/136; and Small Island Developing States (29 December 2000), G/AG/NG/W/97, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_props1_e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2011).

12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador (23 June 2000), G/AG/NG/W/13, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_props1_e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2011).

14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause not more than minimal distortion of trade or production, set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

15 ‘Substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’ (WTO, 2001, para. 13).

16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduction commitments.

17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)/65); 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)/91); 12 Oct 2005 (JOB(05)/230); 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)/304); 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)/303); 11 May 2006 (JOB(06)/143); 7 June 2006 (JOB(06)/173); 16 June 2006 (JOB(06)/189/Rev.1); 28 Mar 2007 (JOB(07)/35); 3 June 2008 (JOB(08)/47); 28 Jan 2010 (TN/AG/GEN/30).

18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)/135); 3 May 2006 (JOB(06)/137); 20 February 2008 (JOB(08)/6); 8 April 2008 (JOB(08)/24).

19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)/187).

20 16 May 2006 (JOB(06)/145).

21 Arguably, civil society organisations also played an important role in highlighting some of these connections. See, for example, Oxfam (2002).

22 See, for example, proposals dated 27 Sept 2002: Cairns Group (JOB(02)/132) and Canada (JOB(02)/131).

25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:‘On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to maintain an adequate level and to take into account the interests of food aid recipient countries. To this end, a “safe box” for bona fide food aid will be provided to ensure that there is no unintended impediment to dealing with emergency situations. Beyond that, we will ensure elimination of commercial displacement. To this end, we will agree effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization and re-exports so that there can be no loop-hole for continuing export subsidization.’

26 6 March 2006 (TN/AG/GEN/13).

27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/122).

28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/78).

29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/93); Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/164); Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/182); Cuba, 20 Jan 2003 (JOB(02)/190/Corr.1; Korea, 18 Dec 2002 (JOB(02)/220); Japan, 28 Feb 2003 (JOB(03)/41; G-20), 18 May 2006 (JOB(06)/147); Japan and Switzerland, 30 Apr 2008 (JOB(08)/34); Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, 6 Apr 2011 (JOB/AG/18).

WTO Talks: ACP Group Proposes Work Programme "Elements," Pushes for Fisheries Outcome.

The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of countries has tabled a series of elements that it says should define a potential WTO work programme on the Doha Round talks, according to a communication circulated by Barbados on the group’s behalf earlier this month.

WTO members are currently trying to elaborate such a work programme ahead of a July deadline. The submission builds on the ACP Group’s positions under the Doha Round talks regarding special and differential treatment (S&DT) proposals, agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), services, fisheries subsidies, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.

The group has said that these outstanding issues, “at a minimum,” are key to bringing the Doha Round trade talks to a close.

The core issues of the planned Doha work programme are likely to revolve around agriculture, non-agricultural market access, and services, though this does not mean that it would exclude other negotiating areas. (See Bridges Weekly, 26 February 2015)

Though the work programme discussions are still to be said at an early stage, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo told ambassadors at a meeting last week that they “are continuing to make steady progress in terms of understanding the issues and each other's aspirations and limitations,” while urging members to continue working to overcome the various challenges that lie ahead.

In its submission, the ACP Group has identified a selection from the original 88 proposals on special and differential treatment (S&DT) to have “economic and practical value.”

Special and differential treatment has long been considered a crucial part of the Doha Round’s development dimension. Originally created as an overarching mechanism to give preferential treatment to developing and least developed countries (LDCs), the measure aimed to help these countries more easily integrate into the multilateral trading system.

To this end, paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration that launched the Round in 2001 granted a mandate to review all S&DT provisions with a view to making them stronger, more precise, effective, and operational.

The ACP group’s communication also highlights “tangible and binding” outcomes from the WTO’s farm trade talks as essential for the Doha Round’s conclusion, citing the importance of an agricultural trading system that is both “fair and market-oriented.”

At the very least, the group has said, the work programme should preserve the gains in special flexibilities for least developed countries (LDCs), net food importing developing countries (NFIDCs), and small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) that were contained in the December 2008 revised draft modalities text for agriculture – Rev. 4 in trade jargon.

The ACP countries have also stressed that a solution on cotton should be part of any Doha Round outcome, and that these agriculture-related results should be reached by this December’s ministerial conference in Nairobi, Kenya.

The communication mainly reiterates the need to preserve flexibilities under the 2008 draft agriculture modalities related to domestic support, market access, and export competition.

The ACP’s suggestions came just as Argentina formalised its own suggestion of adopting a request-and-offer approach for market access negotiations across agriculture, NAMA, and services. Paraguay has also circulated an informal non-paper suggesting a formula approach paired with request-offer for agricultural market access. (See Bridges Weekly, 12 March 2015)

Regarding the NAMA talks, the ACP Group has placed a particular focus on the need to address non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the negotiations, especially those that affect products that are important exports for developing countries. The submission says that a potential NTB package be built around ACP proposals, as well as those of other developing countries and LDCs.

The communication also reiterates that the NAMA talks should not require “full reciprocity” in the reduction commitments taken by developing countries and LDCs, in light of their specific circumstances and interests.

The group therefore called for the preservation of a core set of flexibilities for various developing country groups, as reflected in the December 2008 draft modalities text for NAMA, otherwise known as Rev.3, and says that any alternative tariff cut formulas should use such flexibilities as a starting point.

Last month, several WTO members indicated concrete sectors and modes of supply where they intend to provide preferential treatment to LDC services and services suppliers during a high-level meeting held on 5 February.

Members agreed during that meeting that they would endeavour to notify their preferences formally to the WTO’s Council on Trade in Services, specifying actual preferences by 31 July at the latest – a date that the ACP backed in its submission, while calling for improvements in some of the preferences suggested so far. (See Bridges Weekly, 12 February 2015)

On Mode 4, which is the mode of supply of most interest for LDCs as it involves the movement of persons across borders, ACP members have asked that special attention be paid to new commitments in contractual services suppliers and independent professionals across all sectors.

In its submission, the ACP Group also urged fellow WTO members to reach a deal in Nairobi on a fisheries package, calling the negotiations on fisheries disciplines a “central” component of the Doha Round’s development dimension.

Recent discussions under the Rules Negotiating Group at the global trade body, which is tasked with the fisheries subsidies talks, have showed a continued divide among members on whether rules should indeed be considered a “core area” of the overall Doha Round talks.

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 2011 28.8 percent of commercially important stocks were overfished, 61.3 percent full fished, and 9.9 percent underfished. Fish are the world’s most traded food commodity, with fish exports worth almost US$130 billion in 2012.

Further disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, the ACP Group says, should include enhanced transparency and notification requirements on fisheries subsidies, along with limiting and progressively phasing out this type of support.

Regarding the latter, the communication lists, for instance, those subsidies provided to vessels undertaking fishing practices that significantly harm vulnerable marine ecosystems and habitats; subsidies provided to vessels engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; as well as subsidies provided to any fishing vessel or fishing activity affecting overfished stocks.

The ACP Group also says that it remains committed “to explor[ing] broader disciplines” on fisheries subsidies provided that these incorporate “appropriate and effective” S&DT provisions.

Trade Agreements.

Malawi is a signatory and beneficiary of a number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These include the African Free Trade Zone, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Trade Protocol, bilateral trade agreements between Malawi and Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa, Malawi and Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique, Malawi and China, Malawi and India, and Malawi and Malaysia the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union (EU) and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, and the United States-African Growth Opportunity Act (US-AGOA) initiative for concessional exports to the US market. Since independence, Malawi has been signing trade agreements with other countries at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels with the objective of providing increased market access for Malawian exports.

THE AFRICAN FREE TRADE ZONE.

The following are the Trade Zones:

The bilateral trade agreements aim to encourage and stimulate trade between Malawi and the cooperating partner through the elimination of tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade. The agreement allows the Malawian importers to purchase goods from the signatory country without paying import duty or paying a small agreed duty rate as long as the goods in question qualify under the terms of the agreement and are registered as such with the relevant authorities. Malawi is a signatory to and a beneficiary of a number of bilateral trade agreements under which Malawian exporters and importers can benefit. These include the Malawi-South Africa Bilateral Trade Agreement, Malawi-Zimbabwe Bilateral Trade Agreement, Malawi-Mozambique Bilateral Trade Agreement, and Malawi - Malaysia Bilateral Trade Agreement, Malawi-China Bilateral Trade Agreement, Malawi-India Bilateral Trade Agreement.

THE COTONOU AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND AFRICAN CARIBBEAN PACIFIC (ACP) COUNTRIES.

The European Union (EU) is Malawi’s major export trade partner accounting for 39% of Malawi’s total world exports. Malawi’s major exports to the EU are tobacco, sugar, coffee and tea, fruit, vegetables, nuts and cotton. Malawi’s major imports from the EU are fuel, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances, fertilizer, motor vehicles, medical equipment, military weapons, clothes and printed materials such as books, newspapers and pictures.

Malawi’s economic and trade cooperation arrangement with the EU was formalised in 1975 when it signed the Lomé I Convention between 46 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and 9 EU countries. Since then, Malawi signed subsequent ACP-EU Lomé Conventions at five year intervals until it signed an ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, commonly known as Cotonou Agreement (CA), on 23rd June 2000, in Cotonou, Benin.

The CA provides for the ACP and EU countries to conclude a new WTO-compatible trade agreement which will liberalize trade between the parties and include cooperation in areas linked with trade in goods and services and trade-related issues such as competition policy, investment, and protection of intellectual property rights. The development of an agreement such as this was necessitated by the expiry of the WTO Waiver on ACP-EU trade preferences in December 2007.

The negotiations of these new trading arrangements, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), were to be undertaken between the EU and ACP countries from September 2002 to December 2007, when the Cotonou Agreement would expire.

Malawi is negotiating an EPA under the ESA configuration, which comprises eleven countries excluding the four countries, which have formed the EAC configuration. The eleven countries are Malawi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The ESA group identified six clusters of issues to negotiate an EPA with the EC. These are development cooperation, agriculture, market access, fisheries, trade in services, and trade-related issues (investment, competition policy, government procurement and intellectual property rights).

At the regional level, negotiations are conducted at three levels. The Ministerial level is led by the ESA Ministerial Chair, the Senior Official level is led by two Chief Negotiators and their alternates, and the Technical Level is led by the Cluster Chairpersons.

THE UNITED STATES-AFRICAN GROWTH OPPORTUNITY ACT (US-AGOA) INITIATIVE FOR CONCESSIONAL EXPORTS TO THE US MARKET.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a trade initiative provided by the United States of America to the sub-Saharan African countries to assist in promoting free markets, expanding trade and investment, stimulating economic growth, and facilitating sub-Saharan Africa’s integration into the global economy. The AGOA was signed into law on 18th May 2000. The Act originally covered an eight year period from 1st October 2000 to 30th September 2008 but after several consultations with the African Governments and some lobbying in the USA, amendments were made to the original act to improve the initiative and AGOA III was passed. Therefore it has been extended from 2008 to 2015.

Since independence, Malawi has been signing trade agreements with other countries at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels with the objective of providing increased market access for Malawian exports. It is in view of this important fact, that AGOA plays a major role in its development objectives. Malawi is amongst the 39 sub-Saharan African countries benefiting from AGOA. It was designated as an AGOA beneficiary country on 2nd October, 2000, after successfully satisfying the eligibility criteria requirements stipulated under the legislation. It qualified as a textile and apparel beneficiary country on 17th August, 2001 after introducing an effective visa system to ensure compliance with the requirements of AGOA for exportation of apparel and textile products to US on a duty and quota-free basis.

Formalised system of trading agreements with group of countries is known as.

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